Advocating for Sri Lankan Migrant Workers: Obstacles and Challenges by Gamburd, Michele Ruth
Portland State University
PDXScholar
Anthropology Faculty Publications and
Presentations Anthropology
2009
Advocating for Sri Lankan Migrant Workers: Obstacles and
Challenges
Michele Ruth Gamburd
Portland State University, b5mg@pdx.edu
Let us know how access to this document benefits you.
Follow this and additional works at: http://pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu/anth_fac
Part of the Social and Cultural Anthropology Commons
This Post-Print is brought to you for free and open access. It has been accepted for inclusion in Anthropology Faculty Publications and Presentations by
an authorized administrator of PDXScholar. For more information, please contact pdxscholar@pdx.edu.
Citation Details
Gamburd, Michele Ruth, "Advocating for Sri Lankan Migrant Workers: Obstacles and Challenges" (2009). Anthropology Faculty
Publications and Presentations. Paper 39.
http://pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu/anth_fac/39
Gamburd / Sri Lankan Migrant Workers 
FEATURE: Distant Divides and Intimate Connections: Migrant Domestic Workers in Asia — Part 2. Part 1 
appeared in Critical Asian Studies 40 (4) , 2008. 
ADVOCATING FOR 
SRI LANKAN MIGRANT WORKERS 
Obstacles and Challenges 
Michele R. Gamburd 
ABSTRACT: Nearly a million Sri Lankan women labor as migrant workers, the vast majority in the Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC) countries in West Asia. They are poorly paid and vulnerable to a wide variety of 
exploitative labor practices at home and abroad. Despite the importance of worker remittances to the national 
economy, and in spite of Sri Lanka’s history of organized labor and active political participation, migrants have 
received only anemic support from the state, labor unions, feminist organizations, and migrant-oriented 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). The article contextualizes Sri Lankan migration within larger-scale 
economic dynamics (such as global capitalist policies and processes) and local-level ideological formations (such as 
local political histories and culturally shaped gender norms). The author argues that political freedoms in destination 
countries have a significant effect on organizing activities in both host and sending nations. Comparing the Sri 
Lankan and Philippine situations, the author contends that the vibrant activism in the Philippines correlates with the 
liberal organizing climates in the EU and in East and Southeast Asia, while the paucity of organizing in Sri Lanka 
correlate with the strict repression of guest workers in the GCC. Compared to other destinations, the GCC countries 
give workers (particularly women) less chance for autonomous activities, are less open to labor organizing, and are 
less responsive to political protest.  
 
After three decades of migration to the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries in West Asia, Sri Lankan 
migrants continue to face exploitative labor conditions abroad and anemic support at home. Despite the large 
number of transnational guest workers and the economic centrality of their remittances, migrants lack strong 
advocates among unions, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and government departments in Sri Lanka.1 In 
this article, I argue that to understand the puzzling paucity of labor activism requires an inquiry that encompasses 
not only the activities of Sri Lankan NGOs, unions, and government institutions, but also the wider economic and 
political context, particularly the international division of labor and the constraints that destination countries put on 
labor organizing and diplomatic activities. 
Statistics highlight the importance of international labor migration to the Sri Lankan economy. The Sri Lankan 
Bureau of Foreign Employment (SLBFE) estimates the stock of overseas contract workers has increased steadily 
every year since this migration stream began in 1976, with about 1.2 million Sri Lankans working abroad in 2005.2 
Migrant laborers make up about 15 percent of the Sri Lankan work force, and their remittances contribute 
significantly to Sri Lanka’s foreign exchange earnings.3 In 2005, total remittances stood at over US$1.9 billion; over 
half of this total, roughly US$1 billion, came from the Gulf.4 In generating foreign earnings, private remittances (29 
percent) come second after Sri Lanka’s large garment industry (47 percent).5 Clearly, the country has a great 
financial stake in the remittances generated by migrant laborers, particularly those working in the Gulf. 
Reflecting the increasing feminization of migrant work forces around the world, women make up two thirds of Sri 
Lanka’s overseas contract workers. Domestic servants or “housemaids” alone make up over half of Sri Lanka’s 
migrants.6 Each migrant woman supports an average of five family members; thus Sri Lanka’s 800,000 female 
migrants support an estimated 4 million people, or a little over 20 percent of the nation’s population of 19.5 million.7 
Despite the large numbers of women working abroad and the significant percentage of the population dependent on 
their remittances, however, little organizing around migration as a woman’s issue has taken place in either the public 
or the private sector in Sri Lanka. What gender norms and political-economic circumstances explain this lack of 
support? 
In neoliberal economies, market-driven logic has unsettled older relations between citizens and the state. Aihwa Ong 
argues that people with valued skills have entitlements all over the world, while unskilled laborers are excluded 
from rights both in their host countries and at home.8 Because neoliberalism allows (even requires) the political 
liminality of some citizens, other ethical regimes (such as feminism, humanism, and religious traditions) and their 
representatives in civil society step in to protect individuals from the adverse effects of bare market forces. But to 
what extent can NGOs and labor unions protect workers in developing countries? In this essay, I explore what is 
happening, and, more importantly, what is not happening in Sri Lankan NGOs, labor unions and government 
administrative organs, traditional venues in which activists and state officials advocate for workers’ and citizens’ 
rights. I seek to identify the conditions that hamper state and civil society organizations in labor-sending countries 
from effectively advocating for guest workers abroad — from promoting, for example, higher wages, safer working 
conditions, and systematically honored contracts. 
Explaining an absence or a lack is never easy, especially when examining an isolated case. Therefore I contrast the 
relative paucity of labor activism in Sri Lanka’s migrant sector with the well documented, energetic organizing in 
another labor-sending country, the Republic of the Philippines. I argue that a major source of difference can be 
found in the economic and political conditions of the destination countries in which Sri Lankan and Filipina 
migrants work. Labor dynamics in the Gulf (which receives 90 percent of Sri Lanka’s transnational domestic 
workers) contrast with those in various countries in East and Southeast Asia (especially Hong Kong, Japan, Taiwan, 
and Singapore), which together receive 60 percent of Filipina workers. In short, I suggest that differences in the 
labor climates in destination countries influence how energetically sending-country governments and other groups 
will agitate for migrant rights. Above and beyond these political issues, however, looms the overarching economic 
reality of a global capitalist economy that disadvantages migrant laborers from the global South. 
This essay begins with a discussion of the global economy and an overview of the role of gender in the international 
division of labor. I then explore the working conditions of Sri Lanka’s transnational domestic servant, in the context 
of labor dynamics in the GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council) countries. Turning to the situation in the sending country, 
I consider activities undertaken by Sri Lankan NGOs, labor unions, and state institutions in support of migrant 
workers. To understand the transnational factors that constrain both labor and government in their activities and 
effectiveness, I compare labor-organizing climates in the GCC, Asia, and the European Union (EU). I then compare 
migration patterns in Sri Lanka and the Philippines to identify factors that promote and inhibit the support of 
migrant laborers. I conclude with a discussion of the challenges and obstacles faced by both labor and state actors in 
protecting transnational domestic workers in the global economy. 
Globalization, Gender, and Migration  
Since the end of World War II, theorists have struggled to explain the power imbalances between former colonies 
and former colonizers.9 They discuss dynamics between the global North and South.10 Despite different analytical 
perspectives, all agree that the concentration of capital and technology lies in the global North. Neoliberal economic 
policies have over the past twenty years polarized differences between countries and exacerbated the gap between 
rich and poor with countries.11 This situation provides the context in which transnational migrants move from poor, 
less developed nations to developed ones.12  
Although globalization affects the entire world, dynamics are localized within regions and countries, thus research 
requires attention to ethnographic particulars. For example, modernization in the Gulf does not look entirely like 
modernization in North America and the European Union, especially if the social, cultural, and political context is 
taken into consideration.13 In the Gulf, strong states implement aggressive policies to marginalize migrants. 
Similarly, labor-sending countries occupy specific positions within the international economy and have unique 
histories of labor migration. To explain the paucity of support for migrant workers in Sri Lanka, I will examine labor 
conditions in the Middle East as well as the position that Sri Lanka holds in the international division of global labor 
and power. 
All too often, explanations of transnational labor migration focus exclusively on large-scale demographic and 
economic factors. Anthropologists have argued that these explanations, while valuable, do not adequately account 
for other important influences, such as national politics, household relations, and gender norms, all of which affect 
the micro-processes of labor negotiations and in turn influence labor flows and work conditions.14 Gender relations 
in both sending and receiving countries matter in terms of what sorts of freedoms and empowerment local and 
migrant women have.15 Thus materials written about male migration do not necessarily apply to female migration, 
particularly when migrants go to the highly gender-segregated societies of the Middle East. In addition, women’s 
mobilizing and organizing in their home and host countries take place within local contexts of existing gender norms 
and patterns. 
In the past, scholars examining globalization have often assumed that women hold the fort at home while men 
migrate in the global economy.16 The transnational migration of women who work as domestic servants radically 
upsets the association of “female” with “the local,” and challenges Euro-American commonsense assumptions that 
women reproduce families in the home.17 As part of their paid work, domestic servants take responsibility for care 
work outside the home (and country). As breadwinners, they earn money in the global economy, sending 
remittances to support their husbands and children back home.18 Despite these objective changes in women’s 
activities, older gender values persist in both Sri Lanka and the Middle East. In the United Arab Emirates (UAE), for 
example, the labor laws do not cover work that takes place within a private home, thus excluding all transnational 
domestic workers in the country from labor protections. Similarly, Sri Lanka has no national regulations on 
domestic service, a reality that hinders government and NGO efforts in behalf of women doing this job abroad. Both 
in Sri Lanka and in the Gulf, gendered norms affect the structures and attitudes within which labor organizing and 
government initiatives on migrant women’s behalf take place, contributing to the lack of support for migrant 
women. 
Women’s Work Situation Abroad 
Understanding women’s work situations abroad provides some context for considering the lack of labor and other 
activism in Sri Lanka around transnational domestic workers’ issues. The prevailing labor conditions limit women’s 
ability to resist exploitation. One aspect of disempowerment pertains to living conditions. In the Gulf, most 
housemaids live in their employers’ residences, as do many housemaids in Singapore, Hong Kong, the United 
States, and the European Union. Research indicates that live-in housemaids have much less autonomy and freedom 
than do women with part-time or live-out arrangements.19 Live-in workers make less money per hour than live-out 
workers do and find it more difficult to differentiate work time from free time. Their employers allow them little 
privacy and feel free to call on their labor at any time of the day or night, blurring the line between “workplace” and 
“home.”20 Live-ins depend on employers not only for employment but also for housing. In many cases, particularly 
in the Gulf, this arrangement is formalized with government regulations regarding residence and work permits; thus 
losing a job can jeopardize a migrant’s right to stay in the host country.21 In addition, compared to live-out workers, 
live-in domestic servants generally are more vulnerable to exploitation and have fewer backup safety networks.22  
Other disempowering work conditions pertain to women’s mobility and their social roles within their sponsor’s 
families. Domestic servants working in the Middle East often describe extensive curtailment of their mobility. Sri 
Lankan migrants regularly report to researchers and human rights organizations that their employers confiscated 
their passports to keep them “safe” — an action illegal under international law and International Labour 
Organization (ILO) conventions, and one that causes great logistical difficulties for housemaids who flee untenable 
work situations but cannot leave the country without proper documentation.23 Roughly half of the returned Sri 
Lankan migrants whom I interviewed stated that they never left their employers’ houses during their entire two years 
abroad, or left only in the company of the sponsor’s family.24 Many of these same interviewees claimed to find this 
situation reassuring, saying that the sponsor treated them like a daughter of the family. Yet scholars report that 
migrant domestic workers joke that being considered “one of the family” is a justification for greater exploitation in 
the employers’ household.25 In addition, norms governing familial behavior often disadvantage young women, 
discouraging them from protesting against exploitative labor relations.26 Gendered norms for familial deference, 
combined with restrictions on female mobility, limit women’s abilities to resist exploitation or escape threatening 
situations. 
State-level regulations governing labor relations also influence women’s work situations and their ability to resist 
exploitation. In many GCC countries, labor laws cover male laborers but do not protect household workers.27 The 
same situation occurs in Taiwan, where the Labour Standards Law does not apply to domestic workers.28 In Hong 
Kong, labor laws do apply to foreign domestic servants, but are rarely enforced against middle- and upper-class 
employers.29 Other state-level issues that affect women’s work situations include the availability of health care, 
regulations surrounding bringing in family members, and the possibility of becoming citizens in the host country. 
For example, in Europe, migrant women can have relationships with local men, marry them, gain citizenship, and 
establish transnational families where members have different nationalities.30 Women who work in countries with a 
strong discourse of human rights and an active civil society receive more support from the social system in their 
country of employment and have more opportunities to organize and mobilize. And women have greater control 
over their situations if they are free to leave their place of employment and seek other jobs — rights theoretically 
guaranteed in the few countries that have ratified ILO conventions C97 and C143.31 Domestic servants who can 
change employers without losing their residence permits tolerate less exploitation and harassment at work and have 
more freedom to agitate and organize. 
The reality of work situations reflects not only the laws but also their enforcement. Because few legal and 
organizational mechanisms support migrant domestic workers in the Gulf, women face an uphill battle with few 
allies and advocates.32 Sri Lankan nationals working in the Middle East can obtain assistance from their recruiting 
agency, the local police, or the Sri Lankan embassy or consular office in their country of residence. But in their 
search for profits, labor recruiting agencies may not prioritize worker welfare, and many guest workers feel that the 
local police and job agents are more likely to support their employers.33 And although they generally trust Sri 
Lankan diplomats to side with them, housemaids whom I have interviewed often find services at the embassy 
lacking (noting insufficient staff and Spartan accommodations). Rather than rely on formal institutions in times of 
trouble, women often turn to informal personal networks to help them out of difficult situations. 
In sum, female domestic servants in the Gulf work long hours for low pay. Their live-in status, combined with local 
gender norms and familial expectations, constrain their sociability and mobility and limit their ability to separate 
home from workplace. Lack of legislation governing domestic service exacerbates this difficulty. In addition, other 
state and private institutions (for example, the police and the labor recruiting agencies) stack the deck against the 
migrant housemaid. 
Labor Dynamics in the GCC  
Hardship, injustice, and exploitation often lead to organized resistance, but this has not happened surrounding the 
issue of foreign migration from Sri Lanka. The micro-politics of women’s work situations unfold against a backdrop 
of larger-scale labor dynamics in the GCC. The techniques of governance employed in host countries illuminate the 
relative lack of activism for Sri Lankan migrant workers in both host and sending countries. 
The history of labor migration in the Gulf sheds light on why these labor-receiving countries employ harsh and 
effective techniques in governing migrants. Following the oil boom in the 1970s, guest workers flowed into the Gulf 
and their labor soon became a crucial aspect of local economies. In 1981, six states (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, 
Oman, Qatar, and the UAE) formed the Gulf Cooperation Council. Estimates vary, but sources suggest that guest 
workers make up the majority of the population in many small GCC countries.34 Overall, foreigners make up 37 to 
43 percent of the total population of the GCC countries and constitute 70 percent of the work force, with work force 
numbers significantly higher in the UAE (90 percent), Kuwait (82 percent), and Qatar (90 percent).35 The high 
percentage of “foreigners” worries government officials in these small countries. Even giant Saudi Arabia strives to 
control its guest worker population, which makes up 65 percent of its work force.36  
Not only do guest workers make up significant percentages of GCC work forces, they also occupy less desirable 
positions. Most GCC countries have a de facto dual economy, with well-paying, non-strenuous state jobs held by 
“nationals” and low-paying labor jobs performed by foreigners.37 GCC governments have created public sector jobs 
with high wages and good benefits as a way to distribute oil wealth to their citizens. Foreigners, meanwhile, do the 
difficult, low-status jobs in the private sector. This situation has persisted for the past thirty years, but growth in the 
local population compounded with a halt in economic expansion and depletion of oil resources in certain countries, 
such as Bahrain, has created a need for change.38 Government administration can no absorb large numbers of the 
citizenry, but locals still expect public sector jobs. Citizens have begun to resent guest workers’ private sector jobs, 
but they themselves do not wish to work under foreigners since such jobs would diminish their status and bring 
much lower rates of pay. 
The number, economic importance, and potential political volatility of guest workers concerns state authorities in 
the Gulf. In the late 1980s, many states implemented “nationalization” policies to replace the foreign work force 
with citizens.39 These nationalization policies met with mixed results, succeeding in the public sector but not the 
private sector. In addition, GCC governments crafted legislation to minimize the “threat” that these foreigners pose 
to the “native” population. Strict regulations on length of stay, difficult-to-meet criteria for bringing in family 
members, the sponsorship system, inability to own land and businesses, and the near impossibility of obtaining 
citizenship all work to keep guest workers’ stays short, temporary, or informal, and to minimize their ability to 
organize.40 Other circumstances also exacerbate the insecurity of migrant workers in the Gulf, including rampant 
discrimination, dependence on the whims of their sponsor, visa regulations that make staying in the country while 
changing jobs difficult, lack of legal rights, and the absence of unions.41 These techniques of governance have 
functioned to make guest workers physically useful but politically docile.42 
Despite oppressive political structures, workers retain a degree of agency. People choose tactically whether to resist 
or accommodate to undesirable labor conditions, weighing the current situation against other needs and goals. 
Writing of male migrants, Khalaf and Alkobaisi argue that in the GCC countries, “Given the inferior political, legal, 
economic and social status of migrants, they have opted to accommodate instead of entering into conflict 
situations.”43 Female migrants, with even fewer resources than male migrants and often with more pressing 
obligations at home, opt even more strongly for accommodation rather than confrontation. The policies of GCC 
governments effectively regulate foreign labor by keeping it temporary, docile, under control, and subject to 
deportation. These disciplinary structures strongly shape the choices individual migrants and their advocates make. 
The labor market in the Gulf, bifurcated with the broad distinction of citizen vs. guest worker, is further stratified 
according to gender, ethnicity, and nationality. These divisions undermine class solidarity by enhancing competition 
between other groups. Leonard writes, “Foreign workers are ranked by place or origin, receiving differential 
payment and treatment.”44 Female domestic servants earn less than most other guest workers. In the UAE, for 
example, within the housemaid category, housemaids from the Philippines are paid more than those from Indonesia, 
Sri Lanka, Ethiopia, and Bangladesh in that order.45 Racial, ethnic, religious, and national stereotypes predetermine 
wages.46 Regional affiliation also plays an important role in guest worker recruitment. Over the past twenty-five 
years, the GCC states have employed fewer non-GCC Arab workers (e.g., Palestinians, Jordanians, Egyptians, and 
Yemenis) and more Asians (e.g., Pakistanis, Indians, Bangladeshis, Sri Lankans, Filipinos, and Indonesians).47 
Asians work for lower wages, leave their families at home, and are deemed (rightly or wrongly) by local 
governments to be less likely than co-ethnic Arab workers to engage in labor actions and spread radical ideas.48 
Identity politics inextricably intertwine with labor relations in the Gulf, undermining interethnic solidarity by 
emphasizing fragmenting categories of allegiance. 
Identity politics within host societies also provide a key context for understanding migration. In discussing situations 
of migrant housemaids, one must note the degree of gender empowerment in various labor-receiving countries. In 
many GCC countries, women and men have separate spheres and different entitlements. For example, Kapiszewski 
notes, “Just granting Saudi women the right to drive cars alone should result in removing around one hundred 
thousand foreign drivers from the labor force,” which illustrates how gender norms influence labor opportunities and 
mobility situations for male guest workers and female nationals in Saudi Arabia.49 In most GCC countries, women 
are constrained in their freedom to socialize and move about, and few enter the work force.50 Migrant housemaids 
are similarly constrained as women. Based on evidence presented below on differences in organizing activities in the 
GCC, Asia, and Europe, I suggest that in combination with GCC labor disciplinary techniques, these gender roles 
curtail migrant women laborers’ ability to organize. 
In sum, the GCC countries have extremely segmented labor markets, with the majority of workers coming from 
foreign countries and undertaking poorly paid, impermanent jobs in the private sector. Drawing on over thirty years 
of experience in regulating guest workers, GCC countries have developed effective techniques to control laborers’ 
work, marginalize them from the dominant social structure, and reduce class solidarity across other categories of 
identity. These regulatory measures make labor organizing extremely difficult, particularly for migrant domestic 
workers. 
NGOs and Labor Unions in Sri Lanka 
I have argued above that women’s work situations in their sponsors’ homes abroad limit their potential to organize 
and that this disempowerment is reinforced by the larger governance structures by which the GCC regulates foreign 
guest workers. On the face of it, labor dynamics in receiving countries might appear to have little to do with 
activism in sending countries such as Sri Lanka. To the contrary, I argue that conditions in host countries directly 
influence migrant advocates’ activities at home. In this section, I consider civil society and state organizations in Sri 
Lanka, examining the activities of NGOs, labor unions, and government institutions that support migrant workers. In 
subsequent sections, I argue that the activities of these Sri Lankan groups reflect transnational economic dynamics 
and the organizing climate in host countries. 
Given the insecurity guest workers face while abroad, one might assume that vigorous labor organizations would 
arise in their home countries to protect their rights. But in Sri Lanka, despite the hard work and enthusiasm of the 
few activists who deal full time with migrant issues, civil society and the government have done surprisingly little 
for migrants. In stating this, I do not wish to denigrate the dedication and diligence of migrant labor advocates, only 
to point out that the several small organizations discussed below cannot and do not meet the organizing needs of Sri 
Lanka’s migrant workers, who number over a million strong. 
Several NGOs in Sri Lanka focus on labor migration. The American Center for International Labor Solidarity 
(ACILS), based in a modest house on a residential street in Colombo, Sri Lanka’s capital, lobbies for migrant issues, 
works directly with government departments to support multilateral agreements with other labor-sending countries, 
and funds partner organizations that help migrants directly with social and legal difficulties.51 In 1994 ACILS was 
instrumental in funding and establishing Migrant Services Center (MSC). With a staff number in the twenties, MSC 
ministers to worker needs and does advocacy work, lobbying, and campaigning.52 In 2005, MSC had twenty-six 
affiliated Migrant Workers Associations (MWAs) scattered around the country, with a total of fifteen hundred 
members.53 In addition to building leadership potential and dispersing information, the MWAs engage in activities 
such as reintegration and self-employment projects for returnees; savings, microcredit, and welfare schemes; the 
channeling of complaints from overseas workers to the SLBFE; and advocating for voting rights for citizens 
overseas. 
Action Network for Migrant Workers (ACT FORM) is another Sri Lankan NGO that focuses on migrant issues. 
Partially funded by the ACILS, ACT FORM shares space with a feminist NGO in a suburban house and serves as an 
umbrella organization for other NGOs working on migration issues.54 Many of their constituents are the MWAs 
affiliated with MSC. ACT FORM is also affiliated with international migrant organizations, including the 
Philippines-based Migration Forum in Asia. ACT FORM publishes informational handbooks and a vernacular 
quarterly newsletter, Tharani, which is distributed to MWAs, overseas embassies, and a small group of current 
migrant workers abroad.55 ACT FORM also organizes events on migrants’ human rights, prints informational 
posters, and runs press and electronic media campaigns. In addition, they occasionally consult with the Foreign 
Ministry and the SLBFE. 
The International Organization for Migration (IOM) is a third NGO focused on migration issues. The Sri Lankan 
branch of IOM, based in a stately colonial-era home, does capacity building with the SLBFE and other government 
branches.56 True to their international missions, ACILS and IOM have hosted conferences to bring together labor 
ministers from Asian labor-sending countries to discuss mutual problems and come up with policy initiatives.57 
ACILS organizers do not feel that the conferences have brought about significant policy changes at the 
governmental level, but the organizers feel that their efforts on this front have brought wider pressure from 
international organizations and local civil society to bear on policy-makers in Sri Lanka and encouraged multilateral 
consideration of migration issues. 
During 2004, when I conducted interviews to assess the effectiveness of NGO services in Sri Lanka, those with 
whom I spoke — NGO workers, government officials, and migrants alike — uniformly expressed their 
disappointment with these organizations on a number of fronts. They note that the migration groups are relatively 
small, the NGO movement lacks cooperation and coordination, and the movement has not been able to influence the 
government on significant policy issues.58 In addition, barriers of language and locality hamper grassroots 
organizing. As one activist explained, class barriers have kept Colombo-based civil society groups from getting 
involved in migration issues most pertinent to unskilled rural women.59 The issue of class differences that divide 
Colombo intellectuals and activists from the less-educated workers from Sri Lanka’s rural areas has arisen in 
numerous contexts. For example, Jayawardena and de Alwis suggest that the accusations that Colombo women’s 
organizations are led by Westernized, middle-class feminists who do not connect with local traditions and values are 
a backlash against feminist ideals.60 Although I agree that one must examine the politics behind such a criticism, the 
gaps in world view, language, and locality between organizers and their intended constituents are clear, and these 
shortcomings undermine NGO labor organizing activities. 
Like Sri Lankan NGOs, local labor unions have not taken up migrant issues with vigor — this despite the fact that 
Sri Lanka has a long history of labor organizing in other spheres, with unions organizing first against the colonial 
regime’s labor extraction techniques in the plantation sector and then against post-independence governments and 
business entities.61 Sri Lankan NGOs that advocate for migrant workers, such as ACILS and MSC, are nominally 
affiliated with local unions,62 but NGO activists note that their union allies , pay lip service to migrant issues but 
have not participated in related initiatives .63 In addition, some strong unions, such as the plantation unions, are for 
historical reasons more concerned with the high prestige, masculine sphere of politics than with relatively low-
prestige sphere of labor issues.64 Showing solidarity with transnational domestic workers, even with women 
migrants from the plantation community, has not been a visible priority. Even the few garment factory unions that 
do recognize women’s issues focus their attention on labor relations in Sri Lanka’s Free Trade Zones.65 The relative 
lack of union attention to “women’s issues” or domestic service, whether in Sri Lanka or abroad, no doubt reflects 
local gender relations, the difficulty of organizing workers isolated in separate houses, and cultural norms and values 
that obscure domestic service as a form of labor. 
Despite the general paucity of activism around migration, the NGOs concerned with the issue do agitate for change. 
Recognizing the importance of raising political consciousness around migration, in early 2004 ACILS, MSC, ACT 
FORM, and some affiliated NGOs and unions lobbied the government to provide a way for Sri Lankan citizens 
working abroad to vote in local elections. Earlier, in 1996, Sri Lanka had ratified the United Nation’s International 
Convention on the Protection of Rights of All Migrants and Their Families (1990). This came into force in July 
2003, when the twentieth world nation ratified the convention. Of interest for this discussion is the clause in the 
Convention giving migrant workers the right to absentee ballots while working abroad. Advocates felt that drawing 
attention to voting arrangements would raise the issue of citizens’ rights.66 By 2005, however, no government action 
had taken place on this front. In contrast, Kyoko Shinozaki suggests that the Philippine state instituted absentee 
voting for Overseas Contract Workers in 2003 as part of its effort to increase migrants’ sense of national identity and 
belonging.67 If Sri Lankan migrants voted while abroad, perhaps migrant workers associations would have more 
clout with politicians. And migrants’ issues, particularly those of migrant domestic servants, might become 
significant campaign items. Here again, lack of forward movement on an important migrant issue proves puzzling 
— unless global economic issues and the organizing climate in the GCC are taken into account. 
Government critiques of the way that the NGO movement and labor unions have dealt with migrant workers’ 
problems highlight structural barriers at the national and international level. For example, L.K. Ruhunage, in 2004 
the employment and welfare counselor at the Sri Lankan Consulate in Dubai, contends that unions and NGOs can be 
of little practical help to migrants. Jurisdiction, Ruhunage explained, is one contributing factor: local NGOs and 
labor unions have no authority to settle disputes that arise in foreign countries; the SLBFE and the consular offices 
have to take care of such situations. This official asserted that even international human rights organizations turn 
first to the Sri Lankan Consulate to investigate and clear up problems. Ruhunage concluded that labor unions and 
NGOs had little authority abroad, and saw this lack of effective agency as a reason that these groups dealt only 
tangentially with migrant issues. 
The Sri Lankan government, then, seems to have a monopoly on the ability to administer to migrant labor. In 
addition to the administrative apparatus, the government would seem to have a strong economic and social 
motivation to support its citizens overseas. Migrant remittances provide valuable foreign exchange, and the 
protection of vulnerable housemaids and the families they leave behind receives a fair share of media attention and 
forms the basis for nationalist political rhetoric.68 Migrant issues have seized the popular imagination, which makes 
the lack of government will to strengthen support for migrants all the more puzzling. 
Sri Lankan Politics and Diplomatic Activities to Support Migrant Workers 
A discussion of the lack of NGO and union activities has led inexorably back to the state. If the government indeed 
holds the sole power to ameliorate migrant workers’ unstable employment situations abroad, why has it not done 
more in their behalf? I argue that government inaction reflects three main factors: Sri Lankan gender norms, 
women’s lack of participation in national politics, and (above all) Sri Lanka’s disadvantageous position in the 
international division of labor. 
Lack of government focus on migrant housemaids mirrors the dearth of women and women’s issues in Sri Lanka 
politics. One might think that national politics would favor women: women have voted actively in Sri Lanka since 
1931 (as long as men have), and Sri Lanka elected a woman prime minister in 1960 and a women president in 
1994.69 In addition, women nearly equal men in educational qualifications.70 But despite the fact that women vote 
regularly and enthusiastically in elections, they make up only a very small fraction of elected legislative 
representatives, ranging from 2 to 5 percent.71 Women vote, but they do not usually run for office. As in the rest of 
South Asia, women enter politics primarily through family connections, especially after the assassinations or deaths 
of their fathers or husbands. Although women receive respect once they obtain office, harassment, character slurs, 
and social restrictions on contact with strange men keep most women out of political campaigns and thus keep 
women’s issues out of the political arena. There are few female legislative representatives and, except on 
International Women’s Day, little political discussion of “women’s issues” or female migration. union activities 
focus on “women’s issues” or domestic service.} Similarly, despite educational qualifications, women still lag 
behind men in employment, particularly in professional and managerial positions in both the public and the private 
sphere.72 Women activists struggle against all these barriers, but in spite of the dedicated efforts of NGO leaders, the 
feminist movement remains small and marginal in Sri Lanka. or they have little to show for their efforts: strong 
organizations can have little success at times, no? Is this better?}73 Thus women and women’s issues play only a 
marginal role in Sri Lankan politics. 
Even though women’s issues have not dominated state policy on the social front, migration is of paramount 
importance for the nation’s economy. In its state-to-state interactions with host countries in the Gulf, the government 
of Sri Lanka has historically balanced the interests of its laborers for higher wages and better working conditions 
against the need to maintain favorable diplomatic relations with a major source of employment. As a debtor and a 
developing nation, Sri Lanka has a little status and power in the international hierarchy of nations and its diplomats 
operate within these preexisting power relations when crafting intergovernmental arrangements and protecting its 
citizens abroad. 
Just as migrants accommodate to their labor conditions in the Gulf for fear of losing their jobs, Sri Lankan 
government officials in many cases accommodate to the wishes of the more powerful GCC governments for fear of 
losing valuable employment opportunities for its citizens. For example, in 2008 the Sri Lankan government 
negotiated a new minimum wage of US$180 a month for housemaids working in Kuwait.74 But Sri Lankan 
government officials are also tasked with enhancing economic relations with labor-receiving countries in the Gulf — 
a goal that can conflict with the protection of workers’ rights. For example, in 1998 four representatives from the 
SLBFE visited consular offices in Kuwait and the UAE. The following extract from a discussion of the aftermath of 
a labor dispute at Atraco Industrial Enterprises in the UAE illustrates the conciliatory attitude of the Sri Lankan 
officials: 
Very recently, a large number of factory workers were sent to Sri Lanka as they struck work demanding the removal 
of certain officers attached to the management of the factory. We had a discussion with the management of the 
factory and informed them that the purpose of our visit was to study labour requirement [sic] of the factory and the 
shortcomings of our labour. The management was very satisfied with the labour provided by Sri Lanka. However, 
they had a reservation on the behavior of some of our employees. Notwithstanding the problems they assured 
continuation of using our labour and we gave an undertaking to send more disciplined workers in future.75 
The delegation also found workers’ complaints from another factory “baseless.”76 The content and tone of this report 
suggest that in future cases as in this one, Sri Lankan officials may hesitate to take up the labor cases of overseas 
workers, preferring instead to cement relationships with factory owners and employers. More generally, government 
representatives from labor-sending countries worry that if they support their guest worker population, a host country 
could hire laborers from elsewhere.77 
Government officials have stepped in to help Sri Lankan workers when they have run into trouble abroad and 
diplomatic missions regularly aid stranded workers and support their citizens in court. In the Gulf countries Sri 
Lankan welfare officers and labor attachés have taken up workers’ causes with employers, job agents, and the 
police. But Sri Lankan embassies and consular offices face a numerous challenges — including the understaffing of 
diplomatic offices — in doing so.78 
In 2004, I visited the Sri Lankan Consulate in Dubai and shadowed its employment and welfare counselor, L.K. 
Ruhunage, for a week on his official rounds to job agencies, garment factories, police stations, the jail, the consular 
safe house, and the airport. This experience provided insights into the challenges of diplomatic work. As we traveled 
to the Free Trade Zone in Ajman, Ruhunage remarked that the Sri Lankan consulate in Dubai needed one more 
diplomatic officer or labor welfare officer to handle correspondence and make field visits; at that time, only two 
field officers covered six emirates (Abu Dhabi having an embassy of its own).79 Ruhunage suggested that the UAE 
limited the number of diplomats a country could place in its foreign mission. In addition, maintaining diplomats 
abroad is costly, particularly if a mission does not generate any income. 
Even with additional staff, Ruhunage argued, the Dubai consulate would not be able to enforce labor conditions and 
wages for Sri Lankan workers. Enforcement rights lay instead with the government of the UAE. The Sri Lankan 
diplomats who handled labor issues could represent the interests of their citizens, but they had no official authority 
to inspect worksites and enforce standards. Instead, local labor officials held this authority. In Ruhunage’s opinion, 
the UAE did not employ enough people to monitor the situations of its many guest workers. In addition, the Sri 
Lankan consular office covered accommodation for stranded workers; despite benefiting from cheap foreign labor, 
the UAE government bore no responsibility in such cases. In short, embassies and consular offices could bring only 
a limited number of staff into a host country, and the staff had only limited authority over local labor conditions. 
Bilateral agreements in place between Sri Lanka and the UAE have allowed Sri Lankan diplomats to point out 
problems when high-ranking officials met. But Ruhunage suggested that if the Sri Lankan consular office complains 
extensively, the UAE would suggest that they either stop sending workers or adjust to the current situation. 
Ruhunage thought that emphasis on labor issues needed to take place in other venues, including seminars, regional 
meetings, and academic research. 
Activists and civil servants whom I interviewed agreed that the state apparatus (including embassies, consular 
offices, and governmental departments in Sri Lanka) could better serve migrants by providing additional 
informational coordination between various ministries in Sri Lanka, between the SLBFE and the Sri Lankan 
embassies abroad, and between embassies of other labor-sending countries.80 Hampered by lack of money and staff, 
and constrained by the laws of the receiving countries, governments of labor-sending countries in weak economic 
and political positions often fail to exert effective diplomatic pressure to protect the rights of their citizens.81 
Given all of the conditions described above it is fair to wonder whether any Sri Lankan organization can effectively 
apply pressure to improve the lot of migrant laborers. The preceding discussion of NGOs, labor unions, government 
initiatives, and diplomatic missions suggests a pervasive lack of political will and practical authority. Are states and 
civil society organizations in all migrant-sending countries equally hampered? If not, why not? What factors 
disproportionately disempower Sri Lankan organizations? The answer lies, I argue, not within Sri Lanka but in the 
nations where Sri Lankan migrants work. I illustrate this point with the following two comparisons: the first between 
labor organizing climates in the GCC, Asia, and Europe, and the second between migration in Sri Lanka and the 
Philippines. 
 
Labor Relations Compared: Organizing Climates in the GCC, Asia, and Europe 
As the activities of ACILS, MSC, and ACT FORM show, labor activism and political agitation for migrant workers’ 
issues is ongoing in Sri Lanka, but on a muted scale. The situation is even worse in the GCC — and, as I will argue 
here, inactivity in these two spheres is interconnected. In contrast to the situation in the GCC, organizing activities 
face less resistance in Europe and certain destination countries in East Asia. Staunch activism in countries that send 
labor to European and Asian destinations reflects these more favorable organizing climates. In this section, I explore 
labor relations in a series of these destinations. 
GCC government policies limit organizational activity. GCC countries have strict rules about civil society 
organizations established by their own citizens, not to mention those organized by guest workers, and they deport 
“troublesome” foreigners. Although the GCC governments generously grant their citizens many social welfare 
benefits (free education and health care; subsidized housing, water, and electricity; and well-paid government jobs 
with pensions and benefits), political rights have not kept pace. Khalaf notes, “Political life in the societies of the 
Gulf lacked and continues to lack the institutions of democratic representation.”82 For example, the Bahrain Centre 
for Human Rights lent help to migrants until its director was arrested in September 2004 for criticizing the 
government.83 Volunteers reorganized, and the Society for the Protection of Migrant Workers’ Rights received a 
license to operate in December 2004.84 Other GCC countries are even stricter than Bahrain. In Dubai, “foreign” 
residents can organize “cultural” groups, but these cannot instigate political actions.85 Because of the generous social 
benefits, local people support their governments even though they are not democratic or participatory. For foreign 
guest workers (who do not receive the same largess from the state) local political conditions limit opportunities for 
social organization or protesting work conditions. 
In contrast to the Middle East, the organizing climate in Hong Kong and Singapore is more liberal. In addition, 
gender roles in these states are less restrictive for women. Although the state limits migrants’ rights in many ways, 
Hong Kong offers foreign domestic workers a legislated (but still sub-poverty) minimum wage that, at US$470 a 
month, is nearly four times the going rate in the GCC countries.86 Further, Hong Kong has various governmentally 
enforced contract requirements such as rest days, annual holiday, sick leave, and insurance protection. Moreover, 
Hong Kong has a political environment conducive to labor organizing: “Hong Kong has a vibrant civil society 
populated by lively labour unions, NGOs, media, religious groups and other organizations.”87 Wee and Sim argue 
that Hong Kong differs from many other labor-receiving countries in that it is “capitalist, liberal and governed by the 
rule of law.”88 This organizing climate enables the empowerment of Filipinas, who for many years have dominated 
the domestic service market in Hong Kong.89 Indeed, the majority of the migrant labor organizations are “founded, 
staffed, catalysed or led by Filipinos.”90 
Singapore has a strong state and a weaker civil society, thus political organizing there is less vigorous than in Hong 
Kong. NGOs focus on service work rather than policy and “stay clear of human rights issues for fear that such 
advocacy work may be misconstrued as being ‘political.’”91 The government of the Philippines has intervened in 
labor relations, even temporarily banning Filipina domestic workers from going to Singapore in response to public 
outcry in the Philippines over the Flor Contemplacion case where a Filipina worker was sentenced to death in 
Singapore. Consequently, workers from Indonesia, where the government is less interventionist, have become more 
popular with Singapore job agencies and employers.92 Indonesian domestic workers have fewer rest days and lower 
starting wages than Filipinas, but are now joining forces with Filipina-led NGOs in a growing show of transnational 
labor solidarity.93 These encouraging developments suggest that in favorable labor-organizing climates, domestic 
workers can and will organize, even across national lines to improve their situations. 
Although better than the conditions in the Middle East, the situations in Singapore and Hong Kong compare 
unfavorably to the conditions in the European Union. For example, Leah Briones, who studies migration from the 
Philippines to Hong Kong and to Europe, notes that Filipina women consider themselves better off working 
“illegally” in Paris than working legally in Hong Kong because Paris has a more liberal civil society.94 Similarly, Sri 
Lankans now seek jobs in Italy, preferring them to jobs in the Gulf. Migrant women prefer jobs in Europe not only 
for greater political freedoms but also for higher salaries. For example, Jacqueline Andall reports that live-in care 
work for the elderly pays between 500 and 900 euros a month in Italy.95 Ecuadorian domestic workers in Madrid 
could make as much as 550 euros a month; lack of worker documents, along with the provision of food and lodging, 
explains the lower wages in Spain.96 Au pairs in Germany can make 205 euros a week.97 In Germany, migrant 
domestic workers made between eight and ten euros an hour for cleaning and five to eight euros for child care; au 
pairs and live-ins earned less than live-out domestic workers with a larger circle of clients.98 These wages compare 
favorably to the 100 to 125 dollars (65 to 80 euros) a month that Sri Lankan migrants report earning in the Gulf. 
Wages and organizing conditions in various countries and regions correlate closely with migrants’ valuations of jobs 
in these locations. Sri Lankan workers consider jobs in Singapore and Hong Kong much more desirable than jobs in 
the Middle East, and they value jobs in Europe most highly of all. They note, however, that agency fees for jobs rise 
in direct proportion to job desirability, with jobs in Europe (even illegal ones) unaffordable for most migrants, at 
least on their first journey abroad. Similarly, Filipina domestic workers often see Hong Kong as a steppingstone for 
moving on to Israel, Canada, and the EU.99 These data suggest that workers value jobs in destinations that offer 
higher pay, greater labor protections, and more autonomy. 
Assessing Activism: A Comparison between Sri Lanka and the Philippines 
The evidence above suggests that organizing climate in labor-receiving countries clearly influences the degree of 
guest worker labor activism. Asian and European destination countries provide more protection for migrant workers 
than do Middle Eastern countries.100 Workers in Europe are more likely to organize than are those in Hong Kong 
and Singapore, with workers in the Middle East the least likely of all to organize. Does the degree of organization 
allowed in destination countries also correspond with organizing activity in the migrants’ the sending countries?  
Evidence suggests that in addition to shaping migrants’ career trajectories, situations in host countries influence 
people’s behaviors at home. When worker initiatives (such as those organized by Filipinas and Indonesians in Hong 
Kong) and government activities (such as the Philippine intervention in Singapore) result in better working 
conditions, people are encouraged to organize and protest for their rights. In contrast, when the host government 
represses such initiatives (such as in the GCC), laborers face adversity by accommodating to difficult circumstances 
instead of seeking to challenge or change. In cases in which the larger social structures make protest difficult or 
fruitless, workers find it difficult and dangerous to organize; and labor unions, NGOs, and sending-country 
governments are also hampered in supporting migrants. In short, the larger structures in host countries constrain the 
changes people can envision making, either limiting or encouraging activities at home. 
To illustrate this point, consider the relative paucity of organizing going on in Sri Lanka (discussed above) in light 
of the rich and energetic organizing done by Filipinas in the Philippines and in a variety of labor-receiving countries. 
According to Maruja Asis, in 1997 thirty-eight migrant worker organizations were operating in the Philippines.101 In 
addition, Filipina domestic workers have organized a number of NGOs and labor unions in Hong Kong.102 In 
Taiwan and Singapore they organize around churches.103 Filipinas are thus active in a wide range of organizations in 
their home and host countries. 
A number of unique factors have doubtless shaped the organizing trajectories of migrants from Sri Lanka and the 
Philippines. Significant among them, I hypothesize, are the political and personal freedoms that workers experience 
in the labor-receiving countries. The size, scale, and history of migration; degree of migrant education; and gender 
roles and norms are also influential. 
To understand the role of host country organizing climates on sending-country labor activism within the 
comparative framework proposed here, significant differences in the destination countries of Sri Lankan and Filipina 
transnational domestic workers must be noted. Nearly 90 percent of Sri Lanka’s migrant women work in West Asia 
(particularly Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the UAE, Qatar, Lebanon, and Jordan).104 In contrast, Filipino women work in 
diverse locations around the globe, with only 30 percent going to the GCC (Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Kuwait), 60 
percent going to countries in East and Southeast Asia (especially Hong Kong, Japan, Taiwan, and Singapore), and 
another 6 percent going to Europe (especially Italy and the United Kingdom).105 Thus Filipinas predominantly work 
in states in East and Southeast Asia that give more chance for autonomous activities (socializing, moving around 
unsupervised) and are more conducive to labor organizing than the Middle East.106  
The size and scale of the migrant flows from Sri Lanka and the Philippines also differ. In 2002, over twice as many 
migrant women left the Philippines (over 300,000) than left Sri Lanka (133,251).107 With an estimated stock of 7.9 
million overseas contract workers in 2003 and an estimated population of roughly 82.7 million, nearly 10 percent of 
the population of the Philippines worked abroad.108 In contrast, in 2002 Sri Lanka’s total of 1 million overseas 
workers and its population of roughly 19.3 million people meant that a little over 5 percent of the population was 
employed abroad.109  
Educational qualifications also make a difference. E.P. Thompson has decisively illustrated that the working class 
can generate leaders on its own without recourse to the bourgeois intellectuals that Marx assumed would spearhead 
the revolution.110 Nevertheless, I include data on migrant education in hopes that the years people spend in school 
are of some practical use. The Philippines economy cannot absorb all its college graduates who enter the migrant 
labor market in search of jobs. Thirty-two percent of Filipina migrant domestic workers go to Hong Kong; Wee and 
Sim note that in 2001, 62 percent of them had received some tertiary education.111 Similarly, a large majority of 
Filipinas entering Canada through the Live-in Caregiver Program had bachelor degrees or non-university 
diplomas.112 One researcher noted that most of her Filipina interviewees had post-secondary training.113 In contrast, 
a Sri Lankan survey found that less than 3 percent of Sri Lanka’s housemaid returnees after the 1990 Gulf War had 
passed their A-level (end of high school) exams.114 Most Sri Lankan migrant housemaids have only six to nine years 
of education.115 Despite high numbers of unemployed female university graduates, educated Sri Lankan women 
continue to refuse to take on the low-status job of housemaids.116 These significant educational differences between 
Filipina and Sri Lankan migrant women may in part account for the greater labor agitation among Filipinas. 
The history of migration may also play a role in levels of labor activism. Filipino laborers have been migrating since 
the early twentieth century.117 In contrast, Sri Lankan labor migration began in earnest more recently — in the mid 
1970s. The longer the period of migration, the savvier and better organized the laborers. For example, Constable 
reports that Filipina migrant activists have become more visible and vocal in Hong Kong over the past ten years, and 
are now affiliating with newly arrived migrants from Indonesia.118 Similarly, the second generation of Sri Lankan 
migrants seems poised to migrate in a new way: compared to the earlier generation of married Sri Lankan women 
working in the Middle East, among the current twenty-somethings, more unmarried migrants (male and female) are 
going abroad, and they seek better jobs in more liberal destination countries.119 I argue that the levels of labor 
activism in the Philippines and Sri Lanka reflect the length of time that people from both countries have been 
migrating. It takes time for people to build networks of kin, acquaintances, co-ethnics, and other allies in destination 
countries to facilitate migration, share local knowledge, and provide security in case of difficulties. Future research 
could fruitfully explore whether Sri Lankan migration will transform as Philippine migration already has, with more 
educated, mobile migrants heading to “better” destination countries, where a politicized group of activists may voice 
sophisticated critiques of global capitalism. 
To summarize this comparison, a greater proportion of the Philippines population works overseas, over twice as 
many women migrate from the Philippines as from Sri Lanka, Filipina domestic servants have higher educational 
qualifications than Sri Lankans do, and two thirds of them go to places where protest, though difficult, is more 
possible than in the Middle East. More (and more educated) Filipina migrants have worked longer in destination 
countries that offer more relative freedom, leading to more organizing activity. I argue that these factors in large part 
explain the greater NGO activity in the Philippines as compared to Sri Lanka. 
Conclusion 
In this article, I have argued that political freedoms in destination countries have a significant effect on organizing 
activities within those host nations. Comparing the Sri Lankan and Philippine situations, I contend that the vibrant 
activism in the Philippines correlates with the liberal organizing climates in the EU and in East and Southeast Asia, 
while the paucity of organizing in Sri Lanka correlate with the strict repression of guest workers in the GCC. 
Nevertheless, although the Philippines has greater government activity and the highest number of migrant NGOs 
among labor-sending countries in Asia, activists feel that the government and civil society efforts have still not 
sufficed to protect migrants adequately.120 This raises the question of what factors hamper even the more proactive 
sending-country governments in their advocacy for migrant citizens. Economic evidence suggests that labor-sending 
countries are rarely in a strong position to influence guest worker labor conditions even in liberal, organization-
friendly host countries. The institutions with the most power to protect Sri Lankan migrant workers are the 
governments in GCC countries — bodies that benefit from cheap, exploitable labor, and have no democratic 
obligations to these foreign nationals. This reflects the existing hierarchy among nations; it also reflects the 
expectation that a sovereign nation will regulate its own labor market and labor laws — an expectation that persists 
despite the increasingly transnational character of labor. Given the structures impeding civil and state representatives 
from interceding in favor of migrant laborers, the paucity of labor activism in Sri Lanka no longer seems so 
puzzling. 
Since the inception of the discipline, anthropologists have argued about the relationship between the individual and 
society. Scholars ask how much agency actors have to resist and transform social structures.121 The data presented 
here reveal the reasons that unions, NGOs, and politicians in Sri Lanka have not succeeded, despite the 
wholehearted efforts of well-meaning individuals, in their efforts to support migrant laborers. From whence, then, 
can change originate for Sri Lankan migrants, particularly given the strict political venue of the GCC? The weakness 
of labor-sending countries to protect their laborers highlights the need for two regulatory mechanisms: multilateral 
agreements between labor-sending countries about minimum contract elements and an international mechanism for 
enforcing standards and conditions. But states weigh the benefits of multilateral cooperation against the fear that by 
requesting improvements for their migrants they will lose their share of the guest worker market to other nations. 
Having tried earnestly but inadequately to support and advocate for migrant laborers, migrant workers and activists 
alike point to the Sri Lankan government’s responsibility to protect its citizens working abroad. But key consular 
staff members, such as Ruhunage, felt that they did not have the powers to do their job adequately, shifting 
responsibility toward local officials in the GCC. I saw a certain irony in the fact that when I tracked down 
Ruhunage, the one person most Sri Lankans would hold responsible for bettering labor conditions in the UAE, he in 
turn suggested that change needed to spring from seminars, meetings, and academic research. Instead of merely 
reporting on and assessing labor activism, I find my work now called to do some of the heavy lifting, providing a 
venue for voicing priorities related to neoliberal economic policies, labor issues, gender discrimination, and human 
rights. Repressive structures in the GCC, combined with a dearth of international regulatory devises and a 
disadvantageous division of international labor, leaves migrants, activists, government servants, and scholars alike 
facing an uphill battle to support and defend migrant workers. 
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